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"adequately informed the jury that the death penalty was not mandatory
even if both aggravating factors were proven by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt."
17
It seems evident, however, that there is a fundamental difference
between the two instructions. Instruction No. 1 tells the jury not to find
death if the Commonwealth does not prove the aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under such instructions, the jury could
mistakenly infer that once an aggravating factor is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury must find death. At no time does Instruction
No. 1. tell the jury that it can fix punishment at life imprisonment even
if it finds both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction
No. A would have clarified this assertion. 8 Furthermore, Virginia Code
section 19.2-263.2 states that a court is not to refuse a proper instruction
simply because it does not conform to the model instruction.
Cardwell's inability to give instruction No. A. made it virtually
impossible forhim to convey to the jury its right to vote life imprisonment
even if it found either aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. As
a result, the jury may not have been clear on the scope of its power and
may have thought that once it found an aggravating factor, it must vote
for death. This, in effect, would make the introduction of mitigation
evidence useless since the jury believes that it must vote death even if an
aggravating factor was found. Such a result would be contrary to the
United States Supreme Court's rulings on issues concerning the intro-
duction of mitigating evidence and the effect a jury is required or
permitted to give to it.19
17 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 514,450 S.E.2d at 154.
18 See case summary of Joseph, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
19 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (held that a trial court
must provide a means to give effect to mitigating evidence); Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (held that state procedure cannot pre-
clude the use of mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (held that a sentencer is not to be precluded from the consideration
of mitigating factors in considering a sentence of less than death).
20 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994). Cardwell, 248 Va. at 514-15,450 S.E.2d
V. Simmons Issue
Cardwell also asserted that the jury was entitled to be informed of
the law concerning his parole eligibility under Simmons v. South Caro-
lina.20 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, distinguished this case
by stating that Cardwell's punishment of death was based on the
"vileness" aggravating factor, unlike Simmons' sentence which was
based on the "future dangerousness" aggravating factor.
2 1 Thus, the
court held that Simmons did not apply.
22
The opinion does not state unequivocally that the issue of "future
dangerousness" was before the jury. The admission into evidence of
Cardwell's prior misconduct, however, clearly indicates that it was.
22
Certainly, if "future dangerousness" was before the jury, the applicabil-
ity of Simmons was at issue. If there was error, it is not rendered harmless
by the fact that the jury did not formally find the "future dangerousness"
factor. That is because the ultimate decision of the jury is life in prisor[
or death. Simmons itself illustrates that. "Future dangerousness" was no.
astatutory aggravating factorin South Carolina and thejury did not make
a finding of it. The United States Supreme Court merely found tha:
"future dangerousness" was at issue, as it probably was in Cardwell.
Simmons issues should be raised, even when it is formally deter.
mined before the penalty trial that "future dangerousness" will not be a.
issue. Since the real issue at the penalty phase is choosing either .
sentence of life imprisonment or death, the unresolved Simmons issue,:
of utilizing parole law evidence as mitigation remain important, even ir
"vileness" cases.24
Summary and analysis by
Michael H. Spence
at 154-55. See Pohl & Turner, IfAt First You Don't Succeed: The Rea'
And Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina In Virginia, Capita
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994); case summary of Simmons
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 4 (1994).
21 Id. at 515, 450 S.E.2d at 155. Compare Joseph v. Common
wealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995).
22 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 515,450 S.E.2d at 155.
23 See supra text accompanying note 10.
24 Pohl & Turner, supra note 23, §§ VII-XI.
WILSON v. COMMONWEALTH
249 Va. 95, 452 S.E.2d 669 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 27,1993, KennethL. Wilson
entered the home of the decedent Jacqueline M. Stephens and her
daughter Altomika. There, he murdered Ms. Stephens and stabbed both
her daughter and Takeshia Banks. 1
A neighbor, having seen Wilson leave the Stephens' home and
drive away in Ms. Stephens car at approximately 6:30 a.m., called the
police. When the police arrived, they found Ms. Stephens tied to the bed
and covered with blood. They observed pubic hairs and a dried white
substance on her body. A medical examiner testified that Ms. Stephens
I Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 98-100,452 S.E.2d 669,
672-73 (1995).
2 Id. at 99-100, 452 S.E.2d at 673.
had at least ten knife wounds. The medical examiner also stated that noni
of Ms. Stephens' injuries would have rendered her unconscious durinj
the attack.
2
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, pursuant to Virginia Cod
sections 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, a jury convicted Wilson of capita
murder in commission of attempted rape, two counts of abduction, on
count of abduction with attempt to defile, two counts of maliciou
wounding, attempted rape, and grand larceny.3 In the second stage of th,
trial, the jury fixed his punishment at death based on both "vileness" an
"future dangerousness".
4
3 Id. at 97,452 S.E.2d at 671-72. The convictions were pursuant t,
Virginia Code §§ 18.2-31(5), -47, -48, -51, -67.5 and -95 respectively
4 Id.
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HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Wilson's death sentence
with his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court of




Wilson assigned error to many of the trial court's actions based on
constitutional grounds. These assignments of error included (1) the lack
of direction of the jury's discretion regarding the "vileness" and "future
dangerousness" factors, (2) the vagueness of these factors, (3) the use of
prior convictions in sentencing, (4) the implementation of the death
penalty, (5) death by electrocution and (6) the lack of adequate instruc-
tions on mitigation. 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, held that
Wilson procedurally defaulted these issues since he did not raise them at
trial in accordance with Virginia Rule of Procedure 5:25. 7 This rule,
along with other related rules, requires an attorney to raise the issues at
trial, assign them as error, and brief them on appeal. 8 In this case Wilson
failed to raise these issues at trial and therefore procedurally defaulted
them on appeal.
Virginia rules of procedure create a series of hurdles that, as
evidenced by the Wilson case, must be negotiated to preserve possibly
meritorious claims for further review.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that "[f]ailure to
present a federal question in conformance with state procedure consti-
tutes an adequate and independent ground of decision barring review in
this Court, so long as the State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its
procedural rule."9 As a result, a failure to follow state procedural rules
will also bar federal review of the same issues unless there is a showing
of "cause" and "prejudice." 10
5 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
being reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in
this summary include insufficiency of the evidence of (1) rape, (2) capital
murder, (3) grand larceny, (4) malicious wounding and of (5) abduction.
These claims, as raised and decided, areprobably foreclosed from further
review because Wilson did not allege federal law grounds for them.
Insufficiency of the evidence claims are difficult to federalize. These
issues, however, can be federalized based on a claim of an arbitrary
application of state law. See Konrad, How to Look the Virginia Gift
Horse in The Mouth: Federal Due Process and Virginia's Arbitrary
Abrogation of Capital Defendant's State-Created Rights, Capital De-
fense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 16 (1991).
6 Wilson, 249 Va. at 100, 452 S.E.2d at 673.
7 Id.
8 See Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:25, 5:21(i) and 5:17(c).
9 Michiganv. Tyler,436U.S.499,512 n.7 (1978). See, e.g.,Sochor
v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114,2119-20 (1992) (holding that Sochor could
not make a constitutional challenge to ajury instruction because the state
supreme court defaulted the issue based on the lack of a timely objection
at trial).
10 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,729 (1991) (holding
that all procedural defaults are to be reviewed based on cause and
In addition to defaults, federal courts are without jurisdiction to
decide claims raised and decided only on state law grounds. 1 As such,
any issue raised and decided by a state court on state law grounds will
absolutely prevent a federal court from hearing the issue. Appropriate
state law grounds should also be raised of course. However, the para-
mount importance of federalizing issues is illustrated by the fact that
since 1988, the Supreme Court of Virginia has granted relief in only two
capital cases-both of which were based on fact-specific issues involv-
ing application of Virginia's "triggerman" statute.1 2 This represents one
of the lowest rates of reversal in the nation.
II. Simmons Issue
The only federalized issue preserved for further appeal in Wilson
was whether it was error to refuse Wilson's request to put before the jury
accurate information regarding his parole eligibility if sentenced to life
in prison.13 This issue was based on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Simmons v. South Carolina. 14 In Simmons the Court held that
ajury is entitled to be informed of a capital defendant's parole ineligibil-
ity under a life sentence. 15 The Supreme Court of Virginia distinguished
Wilson's case and held that since he would have been eligible for parole,
Simmons did not apply.16 The issue raised by Wilson, however, has not
been settled by the highest court. Thus, it is imperative that the claim be
maintained in order to secure federal review. 
17
III. Use of Other Life-Sentenced Prisoners as Mitigation
Evidence
Wilson apparently tried to utilize the testimony of a current life-
sentenced prisoner as evidence of what he would encounter if given a life
prejudice) and case summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
4, No. 1 p. 4 (1991). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87
(1977) (holding that a failure to comply with a state contemporaneous
objection rule will foreclose federal habeas review unless the petitioner
can show "cause" and "prejudice" in connection with the failure to
object).
11 If a state court's ruling on an issue is considered "adequate" and
"independent," then the federal courts will not hear the issue. See Sochor,
112 S. Ct. at 2119 (explaining that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the
issue of federal law if the state court based its holding on adequate and
independent state law grounds).
12 See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599
(1990); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307,410 S.E.2d 621 (1991).
See also Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18 (1990).
13 Wilson, 249 Va. at 104,452 S.E.2d at 675.
14 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
15 Id. at 2198. See case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 4 (1994). See also Pohl & Turner, If at First You
Don't Succeed: The Real and Potential Impact of Simmons v. South
Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 28 (1994).
All perpetrators of crimes committed in Virginia on or after January 1,
1995 will be ineligible for parole.
16 Wilson, 249 Va. at 104 n.2, 452 S.E.2d at 675 n.2.
17 See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (1995), and case
summary of Joseph, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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sentence. 18 Although the court found this claim to be defaulted, 19 it may
still be advisable for defense counsel to consider utilizing this type of
evidence in mitigation, particularly of the "future dangerousness" predi-
cate. In addition to its relevance as mitigation, the rationale is that a court
cannot prohibit the introduction of evidence that rebuts an aggravating
factor.20 The United States Supreme Court has observed that "evidence
18 Wilson, 249 Va. at 104 n.1, 452 S.E.2d at 675 n.1.
19 Id. See supra section I.
20 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v.
that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated)
must be considered potentially mitigating." 21 Thus, the denial of this
type of evidence by the trial court would mean another potential federal.
claim for a defendant.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
608 (1978) (plurality opinion).
21 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
STRICKLER v. MURRAY
249 Va. 120, 452 S.E.2d 648 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Nineteen year-old James Madison University student Leanne
Whitlock was returning her boyfriend's car to him on January 5, 1990 in
Harrisonburg. 1 While she was stopped in traffic, Thomas David Strickler
forced his way into her car. His two companions, Ronald Henderson and
an unidentified blond woman, entered the car immediately afterwards.
Subsequently, the intruders brought Whitlock to a nearby cornfield,
where a witness saw them turn off the main road.2
Police searched the cornfield eight days later. They found
Henderson's wallet, Whitlock's clothing, and her body in quick succes-
sion. Her assailants had killed her by striking her head with a sixty-nine
pound rock. Later investigators discovered that Strickler had taken
Whitlock's driver's license, identification card, bank card, wristwatch,
and earrings. 3 Investigators also located hairs matching Strickler's on
Whitlock's clothing. They also found that the shirt Strickler had worn on
the day of the murder contained human blood stains and semen stains
consistent with Strickler's semen. Unidentified semen was also taken
from Whitlock's body.
4
At trial, the jury was instructed, inter alia, as to the crime of
capital murder, the meaning of "deadly weapon," and the crime of
robbery.5 As to capital murder, the jury was instructed as follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of capital murder.
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant killed Leanne Whitlock; and
(2) That the killing was willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated; and
(3) That the killing occurred during the commission of
robbery while the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon,
or occurred during the commission of abduction with the intent
to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to
defile or was of a person during the commission of, or
subsequent to, rape.
6
1 Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 122, 452 S.E.2d 648, 649
(1995).
2 Id. at 123, 452 S.E.2d at 649.
3 Id. at 123-24, 452 S.E.2d at 649-50.
4 Id. at 124,452 S.E.2d at 650.
5 Id. at 124-25, 452 S.E.2d at 650.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
As to the definition of"deadly weapon," thejury was instructed tha:
"a 'deadly weapon' is any object or instrument that is likely to cause
death or great bodily injury because of the manner, and under thc:
circumstances, in which it is used."7 As to the crime of robbery, the jury
was instructed as follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of robbery. The
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant intended to steal; and
(2) That a motor vehicle and other personal property was
taken; and
(3) That the taking was from Leanne Whitlock or in her
presence; and
(4) That the taking was against the will of the owner or
possessor, and
(5) That the taking was accomplished by violence to the
person or the threat of serious bodily harm.8
Strickler's attorney apparently did not object to any of the jur.
instructions.
The jury found Strickler guilty of capital murder (and fixed hi;
punishment at death), guilty of robbery (and fixed his punishment as lif
imprisonment), and guilty of abduction (and fixed his punishment as lif
imprisonment).9 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Strickler';
conviction, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. l'
Strickler later filed a petition for habeas corpus. He made several claim,
among them that his trial attorney's ineffective assistance of counse
should have served to invalidate his conviction. The Commonwealti
moved to dismiss, and the circuit court granted this motion. 11 Th
Supreme Court of Virginia granted Strickler an appeal limited to tw,
issues. First, Strickler contended that the trial court had erred in refusin
to vacate his sentence because the capital murder jury instructio
included the predicate offense of abduction with intent to defile. Thi
7 Id. at 125, 452 S.E.2d at 650.
8 Id.
9 ld. at 125-26, 452 S.E.2d at 650-51.
10 Stricklerv. Commonwealth, 241 Va.482,404S.E.2d227 (1991
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).
11 Strickler, 249 Va. at 121-22, 452 S.E.2d at 648.
